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DYNAMIC INNOVATIVE INEFFICIENCY IN PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENT SETTLEMENTS
Ian Hastings
Ineffective policing of bad patents remains a main focus of the
academy with respect to Hatch- Waxman challenge settlements, but
the potential of the challenge structure for weakening justified,
good patents has gone relatively unnoticed. Currently, the most
rational target for a generic challenger is a highly profitable
patent, whether it is weak or strong. The pioneer patentee will be
particularly risk averse with respect to blockbuster drugs and,
therefore, willing to concede much in settlement negotiations out of
fear of the vagaries of patent trials. Given that blockbuster drugs
are used to subsidize the research and marketing of loss-producing
drugs, to decrease the expected value of a popular drug is to
discourage not only the development of future, likewise profitable
drugs, but also a host of other more specialized drugs. This article
examines the problem of innovative inefficiency within the Hatch-
Waxman regime and proposes an approach for reform.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Hatch-Waxman Act (the "Act") tries to answer a difficult
question-how does one bolster patent protection for
pharmaceutical companies that spend hundreds of millions of
dollars on researching and developing drugs, while ensuring that
the law denies monopoly protection to holders of improvidently
granted patents?' The Act's answer, providing off-setting
* Ian Hastings is a stagiaire at the Brussels office of Cleary Gottlieb Steen and
Hamilton LLP. He received his civil law degree from University College
Dublin, Ireland, in 2010, and his LL.M. from The University of Chicago Law
School, Illinois, in 2011. Many thanks go to Alan Devlin for all his help with
this paper.
' Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
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incentives for pioneers and generics, has proven moderately
successful in spurring greater levels of generic competition without
materially suppressing the incentives for pioneer drug
manufacturers to invent.2
Unfortunately, pharmaceutical companies (pioneers and
generics) have manipulated the complex regulatory framework put
in place by the Act, and in doing so have stymied the goals of this
legislation. The structure that the Act provides for policing "bad
patents" forms the arena for these questionable maneuvers.' Under
the Act, a generic producer is encouraged to challenge the validity
of a drug patent on the promise that if it is the first to do so, not
only will the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of the
patentee's drug carry over to the generic's bio-equivalent, but the
generic challenger will also gain an extremely valuable 180-day
marketing exclusivity period against its competitors; a generic
challenger does not need to obtain a court decision in its favor to
reap the above benefits; it simply must not lose or withdraw.4 The
generic producer may aim to settle such challenge suits, rather than
bring them to judgment.
In settling these challenge proceedings, some brand-name drug
manufacturers have been paying potential generic-drug
competitors to concede the validity of the relevant patents.' Other
settlements under the Hatch-Waxman Act do not involve payments
from pioneer to generic and will take the form of a "non-
2 See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patents: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REv. 37, 49-51 (2009-10).
3 See id at 70; C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity:
Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 78 ANTITRUST L.J.
(forthcoming 2011), http://ssm.com/abstract=1736822; C. Scott Hemphill,
Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1553, 1568-73 (2006) [hereinafter Hemphill,
Paying for Delay]; Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1749-56 (2002-03).
4 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i) (2006).
5 See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323,
1327-30 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d
187, 193 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058
(11th Cir. 2005); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 899-903
(6th Cir. 2004).
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aggression pact" between the two. Here, the status of the patent
will remain undetermined, but in return for withdrawing the
challenge, the generic will usually be able to enter the market some
years earlier than the official end-date of the patent.6 Both these
kinds of settlements, the first commonly referred to as "pay-for-
delay" or "reverse-payment" agreements, are a source of
considerable academic frustration and debate.' Despite receiving
the blessing of the Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Second
Circuits,' many argue that these pay-for-delay and non-aggression
settlements represent little more than a means for pioneer drug
companies to extend the lifespan of ill-gotten patents and harm
consumer welfare.'
However, others contend that such settlements are not statically
inefficient in the allocative sense as they do not unnaturally
preserve the deadweight losses associated with patents, but, rather,
6 See generally Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 3, at *21.
See, e.g., Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, in 4
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 145 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2004);
ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 167 (2009); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 15.3Al (2d ed. 2010);
Carrier, supra note 2; Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent
Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L.
REV. 747, 779-96 (2002); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak
Patents?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1347 (2008); Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra
note 3; Hovenkamp et al., supra note 3; Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECoN. PERSPECTIVES 75 (2005); Catherine J.K.
Sandoval, Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements: Presumptions,
Procedural Burdens, and Covenants Not to Sue Generic Drug Manufacturers,
26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 141 (2010); Marc G.
Schildkraut, Patent Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 1033 (2004); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent
Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391 (2003); Robert D. Willig & John P. Bigelow,
Antitrust Policy Towards Agreements that Settle Patent Litigation, 49
ANTITRUST BULL. 655 (2004).
8 See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1333-37; In re Tamoxifen, 466
F.3d at 193; Schering-Plough Corp. 402 F.3d at 1058.
9 See generally Bulow, supra note 7, at 145; FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 167;
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 7, § 15.3Al; Carrier, supra note 2, at 37.
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stand to reduce them.o Patent litigation is an extremely costly and
uncertain endeavor for pioneer drug manufacturers." In exchange
for a certain cheaper outcome through settlement with a generic
challenger, a pioneer may be willing to negotiate outside the range
of its expected value from trial. If we translate this value into units
of years of a patent term, this means that under certain (arguably
quite common conditions) a settlement will result in earlier generic
entry than would occur through litigation. 2
Beyond issues of static allocative efficiency and systemic
under-enforcement, there is the question of dynamic innovative
efficiency, which is the focus of this paper. Dynamic innovative
efficiency in the context of pharmaceutical patent litigation relates
to how effectively the Hatch-Waxman Act provides incentives to
pioneer drug manufacturers to develop and market drugs. While it
is certainly true that settlements reduce the uncertainty of litigation
generally, the character they adopt under the Hatch-Waxman Act
renders them a considerable threat to the innovation landscape of
the pharmaceutical industry. The first generic challenger of a drug
patent is not cowed by litigation costs, as it stands to receive a
valuable bounty simply by being first in line. Knowing that the
uncertainty of patent litigation and the high stakes involved will
make the patentee particularly amenable to settlement along a
broad negotiation spectrum, the generic producer has no need to
root out only the weakest patents, and can chose instead to target
the most valuable.'3
This Article shall analyze the problem of dynamic innovative
inefficiency against the background of the main arguments that
have been put forward by proponents and opponents of the Hatch-
Waxman settlement regime. This article shall examine what
1o See generally Bret Dickey et al., An Economic Assessment of Patent
Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 367
(Winter 2010); Schildkraut, supra note 7, at 1057-67; Gerald Sobel,
Consideration ofPatent Validity in Antitrust Cases Challenging Hatch- Waxman
Act Settlements, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 47, 69-76 (2010).
" See ANTHONY L. MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY: THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO
PROFITING FROM PATENT PORTFOLIOS (2000); Crane, supra note 7, at 757.
12 See Schildkraut, supra note 7, at 1057-67.
' See Crane, supra note 7, at 759-62.
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proposals for regulatory reform might best reduce dynamic
innovative inefficiency while countering other negative
consequences of the Act that have been identified. Part II lays out
the regulatory framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Part III
considers the arguments that have been proffered in support of the
Act's current settlements regime. Part IV looks to the grievances
of those who stand in opposition to the Act's present format. This
part also outlines the issue of dynamic innovative inefficiency.
Part V examines the approach that has been taken by the courts
with respect to settlements under the Hatch-Waxman Act, and how
this approach should be changed in order to reduce the
inefficiencies bom of the current regime. This part also outlines a
proposal for regulatory reform that could work in concert with a
change in tack by the courts. Part IV concludes the Article.
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT REGULATORY STRUCTURE
A. Fostering Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry
In 1984, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to promote
innovation and promote generic competition within the
pharmaceutical industry. 4 Producing and commercializing a new
drug is extremely difficult; a company must spend anywhere
between $150 million and two billion dollars in conducting the
research to develop a new drug and bring it to market." The great
majority of New Drug Applications (NDAs) do not receive FDA
endorsement, and for those that do, the process of approval takes
twelve years on average to complete.'" The clock of the patent
term is ticking all the way through the struggle to get to market,
14 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
' See Alan Devlin, Systemic Bias in Patent Law, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. at *14-
19 (forthcoming 2011), http://ssm.com/ abstract 180891214. Some of this high
cost comes from the fact that even if a company manages to synthesize a drug
that is actually effective, the drug must undergo extensive clinical trials in order
meet the approval of the FDA before it can be put to market. Id.; see also H.R.
REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 14-19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,
2688.
16 See PHARM. RESEARCH & MFR. OF AM., 2006-2007 ANNUAL REPORT 12
(2007).
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meaning that, without some sort of intervention, the effective
patent length would be reduced severely, and the incentive to
innovate along with it.
. The Hatch-Waxman Act compensates for the delays and
difficulties of the FDA approval process by providing certain
extensions to pharmaceutical patents, thus increasing their
expected value and so encouraging more innovation within that
field." Prior to its enactment, the estimated effective patent length
of a drug was seven years." The extension contained within the
Act allows the addition of half the time a patented drug is in the
FDA trials plus the period the patentee is left waiting for approval
upon completion of the process. This extension can last up to five
years and, with the remaining patent length, give a drug-patentee
an effective patent life of up to fourteen years."
Congress also provided for other periods of market exclusivity
not based on patents. A company that offers a drug with a new
active ingredient, as opposed to a delivery mechanism, is entitled
to an extension of up to five years, during which generic
applications are not entertained.20 In addition, new clinical
investigations essential for approval of new dosage forms, new
uses, and adoption of over-the-counter status would be granted
three years of exclusivity.2 '
1 Carrier, supra note 2, at 43-45.
JOHN W. EGAN ET AL., ECONOMICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 105-06
(Praeger 1982); see James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and
Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 433, 451-52 (1986).
'9 35 U.S.C. § 156(c), (g)(6) (2006). See generally Elizabeth S. Weiswasser &
Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch- Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71
ANTRITRUST L.J. 585, 591 (2003).
20 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2006). The exclusivity period is four years for
generic filers certifying patent invalidity or noninfringement and five years for
other generic filers. Id.
21 35 U.S.C. § 156(c), (g)(6). See generally Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note
19, at 593.
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B. Encouraging Greater Generic Entry in the Pharmaceutical
Industry
Prior to the passing of the Act, generic entry was rare.22 If a
generic manufacturer wanted to market the bio-equivalent of a
particular brand-name drug, it needed to submit a New Drug
Application ("NDA") for the generic. In other words, the clinical
trials and FDA approval process had to be performed twice over
with respect to the same drug. In the case of the generic, the FDA
approval process could only begin after the relevant drug patent
had expired.23 The costs associated with FDA approval
discouraged many generics from attempting to enter the market,
and as such, monopoly prices for brand name drugs persisted, often
well after the allotted patent term. 24  The Hatch-Waxman Act
tackled this problem by permitting generics to submit an
Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA"). Under the Act,
one wishing to market a generic drug can rely on the efficacy and
safety data associated with an FDA-approved, patented drug by
showing that the generic is the bio-equivalent of the approved drug
and that patent concerns have been resolved in one of the forms
discussed below.25
A pioneer drug company whose NDA is approved must
identify the patents that it believes would be infringed by the
marketing of generic drugs by listing such patents in a publication
known as the Orange Book.26 When submitting an ANDA
covering a patented drug, a generic must file one of the following
four certifications in respect of each patent covering the drug:
22 At the time Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act, there was no generic
equivalent for 150 drugs whose patent terms had lapsed. See H.R. REP. No. 98-
857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650.
23 See ANNA COOK, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION
FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 38 (1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/6xx/ doc655/pharm.pdf.
24 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2686, 2688.
25 FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 43 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.26 See JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 15 (2005).
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(I) no patent information appears in the Orange Book,
(II) the patent has expired,
(III) it will not seek approval until the patent has expired,
or
(IV) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
generic drug.27
The FDA can approve the first two certifications immediately and
the third when the relevant patent has expired.2 8 Settlement
agreements come into play with the fourth certification, making it
the focus of academic and judicial commentary on the Hatch-
Waxman Act.
When a generic drug manufacturer files a Paragraph IV
challenge, it must notify the NDA and patent holders within twenty
days, detailing support for its claim of non-infringement and/or
invalidity of the patent.2 9 The patent holder has forty-five days to
initiate suit for this artificial form of infringement, otherwise the
FDA may approve the ANDA, putting an end to the challenged
patent.30
However, if the patent holder does initiate suit, it receives an
automatic thirty-month stay on FDA approval of the ANDA. 1
This thirty-month stay acts as another form of extension to
safeguard the expected value of the patent, as well as an
encouragement to the patentee to bring suit in the first place.32 If
the generic drug manufacturer successfully defends its filing by
showing that it either did not infringe the brand name patent, or
that the patent was invalid, the ANDA may be approved, and the
generic may enter the market.
27 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006). See generally THOMAS, supra
note 26, at 313.
28 § 355(j)(5)(B)(i).
29 § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii). The twenty-day limit was added in the 2003
amendments to the Act. Id.
30 § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
3' Id.
32 Id. The period could extend an additional twelve months depending on
when the generic filed its Paragraph IV certification. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii); see
Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 3, at 8-9, n.17.
[VOL. 13: 3138
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Knowing that patent litigation is extremely expensive, the
framers of the Act provided a bounty to generics to file a
Paragraph IV certification and defend themselves in the litigation
that would most likely follow." The bounty takes the form of a
180-day exclusivity period to the first filer of a "substantially
complete" ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification; the first filer
has exclusive marketing rights of the generic drug for six months
following initial commercialization.3 4 This period is extremely
valuable, accounting for most of the profits a generic can make off
of a particular drug." During the 180-day exclusivity period, the
FDA cannot approve ANDAs from other generic filers." Prior to
1998, a generic only secured this bounty when it successfully
defended a Paragraph IV suit against a brand-name manufacturer,
but the courts found such a requirement to be outside the terms of
the Act." Now, regardless of whether or not it actually shows non-
33 See Carrier, supra note 2, at 41-45.
34 § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). Multiple applicants that file paragraph IV ANDAs on
the same day share exclusivity. OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY WHEN MULTIPLE
ANDAs ARE SUBMITTED ON THE SAME DAY 4-6 (2003), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryinformation/Guidances/ucm07285 I.pdf.
3 Daniel F. Coughlin & Rochelle A. Dede, Hatch- Waxman Game-Playing
from a Generic Manufacturer Perspective: From Ticlid® to Pravachol®,
Apotex Has Difficulty Telling Who's on First, 25 BIOTECH. L. REP. 525, 525-26
(2006) ("In general, most generic drug companies estimate that sixty to eighty
percent of their potential profit for any one product is made during this
exclusivity period."); see also MARTIN A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE:
UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA AND PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE
MANAGEMENT 61 (Brown Walker Press 2005) (arguing that the 180 days often
provides the majority of total profits).
36 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2686, 2688; Carrier, supra note 2, at 80 n.62 (2009) ("Until amended in 2003,
the Hatch-Waxman Act included as a second trigger for the 180-day period a
court decision finding invalidity or lack of infringement.").
3 Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 955 F. Supp. 128, 130 (D.D.C. 1997), aff'd,
140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("The language of the statute ... is plain and
unambiguous. It does not include a 'successful defense' requirement, and
indeed it does not even require the institution of patent litigation."); see also
Granutec, Inc. v. Shalala, No. 97-1873, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6685, at *17-18
(4th Cir. Apr. 3, 1998).
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infringement or invalidity, the first generic filer may maintain the
exclusivity period by reaching a settlement agreement with the
pioneer manufacturer.38 The certainty of the bounty has been
identified by Hemphill and Lemley as the primary facilitator of the
anti-competitive behavior that this Article shall explore."
C. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003
Congress crafted the amendments contained within the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 200340
("MMA") to prevent both brand-name drug makers and generic
producers from manipulating certain elements of the Hatch-
Waxman Act to bring about anti-competitive results. This article
explores further the manner in which the Hatch-Waxman Act
facilitates gaming below, but a brief introduction of such practices
is required now so as to properly frame the amendments to the
1984 Act that the MMA affected.
First, the Act prevented pioneer drug manufacturers from
"evergreening." 41 This practice involved brand-name
manufacturers listing additional patents in the Orange Book after
an ANDA had been filed by a generic so as to secure multiple
stays in respect of a single drug. For example, the manufacturer of
the drug Paxil, pending litigation over a Paragraph IV challenge by
a generic, listed additional patents over Paxil, forcing a total of five
additional overlapping stays, which amounted to a stay of sixty-
five months.42 The MMA permits only one thirty-month stay with
3 § 355(j)(5)(D)(iv).
39 Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 3, at * 17-18.
40 Medicare Presription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
41 For a discussion of evergreening, see Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of
Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?,
41 IDEA 227, 233-35 (2001) and Mark A. Lemley & Kinberly A. Moore,
Ending Abuse ofPatent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 63, 81-83 (2004).
42 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 43, 51 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688.
40 [VOL. 13: 31
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respect to a single drug and has thus halted the practice of
evergreening.43
The second problem tackled by the MMA was manipulation of
the 180-day exclusivity period by pioneers and generics to stymie
competition. In addition to unilateral action such as evergreening
and "product hopping,"4 4 the Hatch-Waxman Act also invited
opportunities for collusion between the brand-name manufacturer
and the first ANDA filer, both of whom would be eager to ward off
further generic entry. Later ANDA filers for a particular drug
could not market their generic versions until after the exclusivity
period of the initial filer had elapsed, but the 180 days only started
to run after the 'first commercial marketing' by the first filer.
The first filer was therefore able to effectively bottleneck later
generic ANDA applicants by waiting to enter the market and
frustrate competition beyond the pioneer drug manufacturer.
The ability of first-in-line generics to block subsequent ANDA
filers invited collusion between the generic and the brand-name
drug manufacturers. Patentees were eager to ward off any further
assault on their patents and happy to pay the first filers through a
settlement to refrain from commercialization and stand guard
against subsequent ANDA filers. Such a situation was more
beneficial to the generic first filer than a successful Paragraph IV
defense.46 In addition to possessing a secure and extremely
valuable exclusivity period, it would now also receive additional
revenue from the patentee. If the settlement took the form of a
non-aggression pact without payment, both patentee and generic
still stood to benefit from a prolonged period in which the first
generic filer remained outside of the market. The patentee could
rest safely in the knowledge that no further disputes lurked over
the horizon, while the first filer could generate greater exclusivity
4 § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
44 See generally Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis ofProduct Hopping in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (2008) ("Product
hopping brand name manufacturers ('product hoppers') make a slight alteration
to their prescription drug and engage in marketing efforts to shift consumers
from the old version to the new.").
45 Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 3, at *25-27.46 Id. at *27-29.
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by driving away generic companies too cash-strapped to stay off
the market for the remaining patent length plus the exclusivity
period.47
The MMA sets out a number of forfeiture scenarios whereby a
first filer may lose its exclusivity period, but the manner in which
Congress devised these provisions robbed them of much of their
efficacy. Forfeiture may be triggered by two events. The first is
an event known as the "(aa) clause date," either seventy-five days
after FDA makes effective approval of the first applicant or thirty
months after the date of submission of the first ANDA
application.48 The second event is the "(bb) clause date," seventy-
five days after the date on which at least one of the following has
occurred regarding the patents in the Paragraph IV certification:
(1) in an infringement action or declaratory judgment regarding the
patent in the Paragraph IV certification "a court enters a final decision
from which no appeal (other than petition to the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken that the patent is invalid or
not infringed," or (2) in an infringement action or a declaratory
judgment a court signs a settlement order or consent decree that enters
a final judgment that includes a finding that the patent is invalid or not
infringed, or (3) the patent information submitted in the ANDA
application is withdrawn by the applicant. 49
The forfeiture event is triggered upon the occurrence of the later of
the (aa) date or the (bb) date."o Even if more than thirty months
pass after the ANDA is submitted, satisfying the (aa) clause, the
(bb) clause does not come into effect where a settlement between
the pioneer manufacturer and the first ANDA filer ends the
litigation over the patent's validity or the generic's non-
infringement." A settlement ensures that no judicial determination
initiates forfeiture of the 180-day period under the Hatch-Waxman
Act.52
47 Id. at *25-28.
48 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(1) (2006).
49 Id.
5o Id.
5 Ankur N. Patel, Delayed Access to Generic Medicine: A Comment on the
Hatch Waxman Act and the "Approval Bottleneck," 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1075,
1086 (2009).
52 Id.
[VOL. 13: 3142
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Thus, even with the amendments contained in the MMA,
careful drafting of a settlement agreement can avoid triggering the
180-day period." In addition, it is difficult for later filers to
overcome such collusion by obtaining a declaratory judgment due
to issues of standing; for example, pioneer drug manufacturers can
issue covenants not to sue later filers, taking their causes of action
away.54 Moreover, even if a subsequent ANDA filer was
successful in forcing a forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity period,
it would not be able to recover the period for itself." Thus, a
subsequent applicant has no bounty of its own to overcome the
expenses it would incur in seeking a declaratory judgment of
patent invalidity necessary to trigger forfeiture, giving it little
incentive to do so.56
This combination of mindful settlement drafting between
pioneers and first-filing generics, the issuance by pioneer drug
manufacturers of covenants not to sue subsequent generic
challengers, and the possible lack of means of and/or incentive for
later generic filers has greatly diminished the capability of the
MMA to right the wrongs of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
III. THE BENEFITS OF SETTLEMENT AND REVERSE PAYMENTS
Settlements are immensely beneficial. The judicial machinery
of a jurisdiction is a scarce, expensive, and often error-prone
resource for dispute resolution, and as such the practice of parties
coming to agreements outside of court saves both the judiciary and
society incalculable amounts of time and money." In effect, trials
represent the last resort, which makes a system of private
settlement viable. Understanding the value of settlements,
legislatures and judiciaries construct rules of civil and criminal
procedure to maximize the probability that the parties will settle."
This orthodoxy that settlements are efficient and should therefore
5 See generally Sandoval, supra note 7, at 170-78.
54 id
5 § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(II1).
56id.
1 See Crane, supra note 7, at 757-62.
58 See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 597-601 (7th ed.
2007).
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be encouraged and facilitated where possible is embedded in our
legal culture, and it forms the foundation for those who promote
settlements in the Hatch-Waxman context.59
To be sure, the problems of lengthy and expensive trials are
prevalent in the arena of patent law."o Patent cases can cost
litigants millions of dollars and span years, and such protracted
litigation has the potential to cause one or all of the parties serious
commercial damage, including the increasing likelihood valuable
trade secrets will be divulged through an ongoing discovery
process.6 1
A related issue is that of the uncertainty inherent in patent law
cases. Questions of patent infringement and validity are
exceedingly technical and elaborate, and so it is difficult to predict
how judges and juries will digest the information during patent
litigation and what determinations they will make. Settlement can
stand as a far safer option from the point of view of a party to a
patent suit.
Given these traditional efficiencies that settlement supplies to
parties in a dispute, some commentators contend that, in the
context of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the ledger should not just
reference the savings to the court system and those that trickle
down from the companies in tallying up the benefits of settlements
to society at large-some argue that settlements can be a source of
allocative efficiency in that they can facilitate generic entry
quicker than litigation.62
A patent term has an approximate monetary value, and in
settlement bargaining, parties use patent years as currency. A year
that the brand-name manufacturer gets to keep its monopoly has a
monetary value, and a year that a generic gets to be in the market
(with its first six-months as a duopolist) has a different but also
59 See Crane, supra note 7, at 757-62; Schildkraut, supra note 7, at 1049.
60 See generally MIELE, supra note 11, at 15.
61 See Crane, supra note 7, at 757-59; Ornri Ben-Sharar & Lisa Bernstein, The
Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885, 1886 (2000).
62 See Dickey et al., supra note 10, at 377-85; Schildkraut, supra note 7, at
1057-67.
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calculable monetary value." As such, many Paragraph IV
settlements represent an agreed-upon division in years between the
parties of the remaining length of the patent in question. In
making the settlement decision, parties calculate what their
expected-value of litigation would be (probability of success
multiplied by value of favorable outcome), and negotiate within
the range of Pareto-superior bargains, which are those bargains that
leave both the generic challenger and the brand-name drug
manufacturer better off than they would be relative to litigation."
The risk aversion of one or both of the parties may expand the
bargaining range, in that one or both of the parties may be willing
to give some ground in return for the certainty of outcome that the
settlement affords.5
Given that the bargaining chips are years, there exists within
the settlement range pro-competitive settlements, settlements that
permit generic entry faster than litigation would. If the chance of a
pioneer drug maker winning a Paragraph IV challenge for a ten-
year patent is fifty percent, then its expected value of litigation is
the same as five years of patent enjoyment. From society's
standpoint, that means five years until generic entry.
The argument of Schildkraut and others is that risk aversion
renders pioneer drug makers willing to sacrifice some of their
expected-value from litigation for certainty.6 Generally,
companies are less risk averse than individuals when dealing with
63 See Dickey et al., supra note 10, at 377-85; Schildkraut, supra note 7, at
1057-67. See generally Robert D. Willig & John Bigelow, Antitrust Policy
Toward Agreements that Settle Patent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 655
(2004).
6 See generally Willig & Bigelow, supra note 63.
65 See POSNER, supra note 58, at 478 (noting that in general corporations
behave in a less risk averse fashion than individuals, although individual firm
managers with significant wealth locked up in the corporation may continue to
exhibit a low tolerance for risk. Inventors, whether individual or corporate, may
be less risk averse than the general population, since the outcome of research
and development is often unpredictable although the rewards may be high);
Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes-A Proposed Definition of "First to
Invent, " ALA. L. REV. 755, 808 (1998) (asserting that inventors are likely among
the least risk averse people on the planet); Crane supra note 7, at 759-62.
66 See Schildkraut, supra note 7, at 1057-67.
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high stake investments due to their comparatively more diversified
investment portfolios, but risk aversion seems likely to be
prevalent among pharmaceutical companies in respect to their most
valuable drug patents. As alluded to above, many drug patents are
either commercially useless because they are attached to a drug
which does not gain FDA approval necessary for marketing,7 or
are not so lucrative as to cover the research, development, and
regulatory approval costs that went into them.6 1 Pharmaceutical
companies rely on the profits earned from certain "blockbuster"
drugs to subsidize the production and marketing of loss-making or
simply less profitable drugs, as well as the research projects that do
not yield a marketable drug.69  Blockbuster drug patents are
generally too rare to form part of a diversified portfolio, and, when
dealing with them, pioneer drug companies rationally take a more
risk averse approach. To have one blockbuster patent eradicated
could mean the death of multiple avenues of research along with
the possibility of future gain. As such, pharmaceutical companies
often expand the range of possible settlement agreements beyond
the expected value of litigation according to their desire to
maintain with certainty a patent foundational to their company's
success. Litigation costs place the boundary of possible
agreements even further beyond the expected value of trials.
Recalling that settlement agreements in the Hatch-Waxman
context often take the form of a division of remaining patent years
between the generic and the pioneer, the fact that the risk and cost
67 The FDA will only approve about twenty percent of compounds that make
it to human trials, and those compounds are a tiny subset of those that are
initially studied. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Focus ON: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 82 (2006), available at http://www.america.gov/media/
pdf/books/iprbook.pdf#popup. See generally JAMES O'DONNELL, DRUG INJURY:
LIABILITY, ANALYSIS, AND PREVENTION 60 (2d ed. 2005).
68 See COOK, supra note 23, at xv ("For most drugs, the returns from
marketing do not exceed the average capitalized costs of development. As a
result, for a company's average returns to exceed its average development costs,
the company must discover and market a highly profitable drug from time to
time.").
69 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, Business Testimony: Current Innovation
Landscape in Selected Industries, in To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
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aversion of the pioneer broadens the settlement range means that
generic entry can often occur sooner than it would under litigation
alone. Thus we see one justification for non-aggression pact
settlements between pioneers and generics pursuant to Paragraph
IV certification suits.
However, commentators argue further that the reverse
payments can, in a variety of circumstances, facilitate this welfare-
enhancing capability of Hatch-Waxman patent settlements.70 First,
if there exists no connection between the negotiating ranges of the
parties due to information asymmetry and mistaken optimism,
reverse payments may mend the gap between the ranges by raising
the expected value of settlement to the generic drug maker
compared to litigation. By way of example, suppose a generic was
only willing to accept near-immediate entry, one or two years from
settlement, due to mistaken optimism about trial. A reverse
payment from a patentee could make the generic willing to wait for
a time acceptable to the patentee. In this sense, a reverse payment
could be pro-competitive, in that it avoids litigation that would
most likely have led to generic entry only after the expiration of
the patent, and could lead to generic entry substantially earlier."
In addition to circumstances of mistaken optimism, a reverse-
payment bridge between settlement ranges may be called for where
a generic is in need of immediate revenue to stay afloat and,
therefore, be unwilling to accept a settlement agreement that
requires it to wait for a number of years during which it would
receive no income.72 Of course, reverse payments are a double-
edged sword in that they also have an anti-competitive potential,
with the division of years perhaps often falling outside the
consumer-friendly settlement range.
Patent settlements can be valuable not only in terms of
allocative efficiency, but also in terms of innovative efficiency.
The above discussion relates to how the risk aversion of pioneer
drug manufacturers may lead to quicker generic entry of an
existing drug, but risk aversion also plays a part in the decision to
70 Schildkraut, supra note 7, at 1059-65.
7' Id. at 1063.72Id. at 1064.
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invest in the development of a drug. A firm will sink funds into
research and development when the present value of the expected
future income stream from the developed product meets or exceeds
its development and production costs." In calculating the expected
future income stream of the product, the company will account for
the possibility that a successful and profitable patent will be
declared by a court to be invalid. Settlement operates as a form of
insurance against the risk of a declaration of invalidity. By
providing a range of certain outcomes, settlement increases the ex
ante value of a drug to manufacturers who maintain even a
nominal level of risk aversion. Thus, settlements form part of the
Hatch-Waxman set of incentives to innovate in the pharmaceutical
field, and their removal or restriction in this arena could be
damaging in the long term.
In the context of Hatch-Waxman Paragraph IV certification
suits, settlements, both with and without reverse payments, can
give rise not only to static efficiencies-in that time and money are
saved by courts and litigants-but also dynamic allocative and
innovative efficiencies. By accelerating generic entry, settlements
increase consumer surplus more quickly, and provide an insurance
mechanism for the risk averse to encourage them to invest in the
creation of new drugs.
IV. THE DANGERS OF SETTLEMENTS AND REVERSE PAYMENTS
Settlements in the context of Paragraph IV challenges are the
source of considerable vitriol within certain sectors of the legal
academy, the FTC, and other factions within congress. In light of
the litany of benefits seemingly stemming from settlements that are
laid out above, what is the rationale behind this displeasure, and is
it justified?
A. Static Allocative Inefficiency
The most commonly encountered arguments leveled against
settlements within Paragraph IV challenges relate to how such
settlements may be calibrated so as to hurt consumer welfare by
73 See Crane, supra note 7, at 762-65.
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unnaturally delaying generic entry.74 The primary focus of this
academic discussion is on settlements which contain reverse
payments.
Commentators such as Hemphill, Hovenkamp, and Lemley
argue that reverse payments are suspicious on the understandable
presumption that if a drug maker is willing to pay another to drop a
challenge and stay off the market for a number of years, the
likelihood seems greater that the patent in question is weak or ill-
gotten." Thus agreements involving such payments effectively
safeguard bad patents, and force lengthened monopoly and later
duopoly prices that society should not have to pay.
Some have countered this argument by arguing that reverse
payments serve a valuable role in negotiation by overcoming the
information asymmetries and misplaced optimism that can often
bar settlement outside of court.76 However, the response is
incomplete. In spite of the legitimate functions that reverse
payments can serve, they can also accommodate the anti-
competitive side of the settlement range, providing for later generic
entry than would occur under litigation.
The question is then which model is more realistic. While
there is something intuitively attractive to the idea that a reverse
payment betrays knowledge on the part of the brand-name drug
maker that its patent is vulnerable, the highly uncertain nature of
patent trials militates against this notion that such payments are
necessarily or per se illegitimate. That is not to say they should not
be treated with suspicion, and indeed Hemphill provides us with a
nuanced argument as to why reverse payments might tend towards
being anti-competitive.n Hemphill takes the model used by
Schildkraut but modifies it to include the certain value of the 180-
day exclusivity period, which accrues to the first generic filer
regardless of success at trial and which is difficult to forfeit; with
74 See generally Bulow, supra note 7; FELDMAN, supra note 7; HOVENKAMP
ET AL., supra note 7; Carrier, supra note 2.
7' Hovenkamp et al., supra note 3, at 1751-57.
76 See Crane, supra note 7, at 759-62; Schildkraut, supra note 7, at 60-61;
supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
n7 Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 3, at 1588-95.
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this extra bargaining chip in place, Hemphill argues that Paragraph
IV settlements agreements are more likely to fall beyond the
expected-value point of trials on the anti-competitive side of the
spectrum."
Buttressing this argument is the realistic observation that, if
receiving reverse payments, a generic first filer is largely
indifferent to entering the market sooner rather than later," as its
exclusivity period and therefore the bulk of its profits, is protected.
The generic producer may rationally be happy to accept a payment
in compensation for the discounted value of its future profits and
stay off the market, while the pioneer may be willing to make such
a payment, even if it is substantial, in order to preserve even a
fraction of its monopoly rents. This, Hemphill argues, indicates a
systemic problem with reverse payments, which should lead us to
see them as presumptively, but not per se, illegal."
B. Dynamic Allocative Inefficiency
Lemley and Hemphill also pointed to the dangers inherent in
Hatch-Waxman settlements in terms of dynamic allocative
inefficiency."' The framers of the Hatch-Waxman Act designed the
180-day exclusivity period as a bounty to entice generic companies
to undertake the heavy litigation expenses that go alongside a
patent-invalidity suit so that they might effectively police bad
patents.82 Yet effective policing has not resulted from the presence
of this bounty. Yes, there have been many Paragraph IV
challenges, but the challenges do not tend to result in patents being
declared invalid.83 As explained above, the relative certainty of
gaining the 180-day exclusivity period has led generic challengers
to be somewhat indifferent to the continuation of a patent. A
generic, through filing a challenge, can stand to gain more from
" Id. at 1590-93.
79 See Schildkraut, supra note 7, at 1058-59 (discussing situations in which
the generic is so strapped for cash that it must enter the market immediately).
80 Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 3, at 1615.
81 Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 3, at *20-24 (arguing consumers lose when
patent settlements are reached).
82 Carrier, supra note 2, at 41-47.
83 See Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 3, at *2.
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extracting payment from the pioneer drug manufacturer and/or
through maintaining a non-aggression pact with the patentee than it
might through going the whole nine yards to take the patent down.
Another issue to consider is the practice of rent seeking by
generic challengers that aim to game the pioneer manufacturer into
giving up as much of the worth of the patent as possible and to
block further competition from later ANDA filers.84 These rents
can be greater and more secure than those the generics stand to
gain under a successful Paragraph IV challenge. Generics and
patentees can construct settlement agreements in such a way that it
is very difficult for later ANDA filers to trigger the 180-day period
that expedites the transition from monopoly to duopoly to
competitive market." As in the static inefficiency case, the blame
for the ability of generics and patentees to collude to block further
generic entry, and, in a more general sense, for the mutation of the
source of rents from being policing patentees to colluding with
them, lies with the certainty of the patent. Lemley and
Hemphill's solution is to require that the generic challengers
"successfully defend" a patent infringement suit born of a
Paragraph IV challenge." With this framework in place, the
incentives of patentees and generic challengers could be reset to
adversarial, thus bringing about more effective policing by
generics, alleviating the problem of later ANDA filer bottlenecks,
and enhancing consumer welfare."
C. Dynamic Innovative Inefficiency
The focus of this paper is another inefficiency that Paragraph
IV settlements may perpetuate, and one that commentators have
84 Id. at 16-25.
85 Sandoval, supra note 7, at 152-56.
86 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 3, at 1755-56.
87 Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 3, at *35-35 ("We do not propose an exact
return to the successful defense requirement .... The first generic would
receive the bounty if it successfully defeats the patent owner, obtains a
settlement that permits immediate entry, or receives FDA approval having never
been sued.").
'8 See Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 3, at *38-49.
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not so fervently targeted, that of dynamic innovative inefficiency.8 9
What I mean by dynamic innovative inefficiency is the
inefficiency of too little innovation as a result of the expected
value of pharmaceutical patents being insufficient. This notion
may appear counter-intuitive, given that one of the arguments
proffered by those who favor Paragraph IV settlements is that they
preserve or even enhance the expected value of the patent, thus
giving greater incentive to innovate." If patents were left to the
mercy of trial, the argument goes, the necessary litigation expenses
and unavoidable uncertainty would reduce the patent's value, as of
course could the court's ruling, perhaps to a significant extent.9 1
Some commentators on the other side of the settlement debate
share this intuition that patent settlements preserve or enhance the
expected value of patents, but they argue that this preservation is
not warranted when balanced against the allocative harm it causes.
Hemphill characterizes the Hatch-Waxman Act as a tax on
innovation.9 2 This analogy is used to make the argument that pay-
for-delay settlements should be presumptively illegal in that they
generally represent "tax evasion," in the sense that pioneers
collude with generics to illegitimately safeguard their patents.93 So
how then could settlements be damaging innovative efficiency by
reducing the expected value of patents? In order to see why, we
have to broaden our analysis to include not only those patentees
who have received bad patents, but also those who have received
good patents. Both of these classifications are crude in that
determining what is a good or bad patent is left to the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the court system, neither
of which is an entirely capable arbiter of the elaborate and
technical matters at play.94 We may suspend consideration of
problems with this taxonomy for the time being, and proceed with
89 It is usually brought up in the context of support for Hatch-Waxman
settlements. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 7, at 779-96.
90 Id.
9' See generally Dickey et al., supra note 10.
92 Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 3, at 1604-06.
93 Id. at 1604-10.
94 See Dout Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 46 (2007).
[VOL. 13: 3152
Dynamic Innovative Inefficiency
this categorization to make some initial generalized points about
dynamic innovative efficiency within the Hatch-Waxman Act
regime.
As Hemphill argues, the intent behind the Hatch-Waxman Act
was to effect a compromise between allocative and innovative
efficiency. 5 In other words, the aim was to lengthen legitimate
patents while at the same time limiting or eradicating bad patents.
However, the manner in which the Act makes bad patents
vulnerable is not surgical in that it renders many justified patents
prone to attack.
We must remember how difficult it is to predict the outcome of
a patent case. The PTO and court system are plagued by time
constraints, limited understanding, and systematic biases.96 The
objective strength of a patent may not be reflected in a court
decision. Thus, if faced with a Paragraph IV challenge, a brand-
name manufacturer's confidence in its own patent will not always
track its determination as to the probability of success at trial. In
the same sense, in challenging a patent, a generic manufacturer
need not be sure of the challenged patent's frailty in order to
reasonably expect success at trial.
This is why settlement is so prevalent in the Hatch-Waxman
context and, indeed, in all patent suits. Each party's call on the
probability of success at trial tends towards fifty percent, making
settlement, albeit with a substantial range, the more rational option
for both. This gravitation towards fifty percent determinations on
the probability of success is reflected in the models used by
Schildkraut, Dickey et al. and Hemphill." So, if challenged, a
95 Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 3, at 1604-10.
96 See Devlin, supra note 15, at *33-66.
9 See Dickey et al., supra note 10, at 378 ("[T]he generic manufacturer both
believes that it has and in fact has a fifty percent chance of winning the patent
case[,] and the brand-name manufacturer also has, and perceives, a fifty percent
chance of winning."); Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 3, at 1604-10.
As Schildkraut has explained:
We can illustrate risk aversion using the example of two litigants
negotiating a dispute in 2000 over a patent that expires in 2010. The
patent holder believes it has a fifty percent chance of winning, meaning
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settlement agreement may diminish the value of even a strong
patent. Both the challenger and the patentee know that patent suits
can, at worst, be very expensive coin flips, and both know that in
this context it is rational for the patentee to spend nearly the full
value of the patent to maintain a slice of its monopoly rents-the
potential for gaming is manifest. This is the rent that Lemley and
Hemphill identified as being sought by generic challengers, and the
reason why challenges are so common.98 A generic need not win a
patent invalidity case; it need only challenge and thereafter
manipulate the brand-name manufacturer into parting with some of
its monopoly profits or allowing it to enter the market sooner than
it would under litigation.
Now the problem of dynamic innovative inefficiency becomes
clear. Given the certainty of their bounty, generics have little
reason to be selective in their challenges, and so they may as well
go after the holders of good patents. These patentees may have
little choice but to part with some, perhaps a substantial amount, of
their profits. This means that patents in the pharmaceutical field
are of reduced value. Regardless of strength, they are subject to
challenge, and given the unpredictability of patent litigation,
pioneer drug manufacturers may lose much of even a good patent's
value in order to secure settlement. In other fields, the lack of
certain compensation for litigation places a limit on challenges,
one that is not present in pharmaceuticals. Thus, the holders of
good patents are collateral victims of a policing mechanism that is
ineffective at tackling bad patents. Taking Hemphill's
characterization of the 180-day bounty as a tax on innovation, we
can see that the tax is too high." Yet, we need to localize this
issue, and assess its depth.
that the mean expected outcome of the litigation is that the alleged
infringer will enter in 2005.
Schildkraut, supra note 7 at 1057-67.
98 See Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 3, at *3.
99 See Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 3, at 1612-16 ("The combined
effect of the tax and subsidy reflects contrary forces. Consumer access is
promoted by the unique incentive to challenge patents. Innovation is supported
by the term extensions, initial delay based upon data exclusivity, and automatic
stay.").
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Pursuant to the MMA amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act,
settlements brokered between generics and patents regarding
ANDA Paragraph IV filings have to be reported to the FTC.'" The
number of settlements reported has grown steadily from fourteen
in 2004 to 156 in 2011.' Of the 156 settlements filed in 2011 so
far, fifty-four involve first-filing generics.10 2 Settlements allowing
immediate generic entry have grown from nine in 2004 to twenty-
eight in 2011, while the number involving compensation has risen
from zero in 2004 to twenty-eight in 2011.'3 Lawsuits have been
particularly prevalent on blockbuster drugs such as Cipro, Claratin,
Paxil, Pravachol, Prisolec, Prozac, and Zoloft.'" Of the ten top-
selling brand drugs in the United States in 2006, at least seven
(Nexium, Pravacid, Singulair, Effexor, XR, Plavix, and Lexapro)
were the subject of litigation under the Hatch-Waxman Act in
2008." The twenty-eight pay-for-delay settlements filed with the
FTC in 2011 involve twenty-five different branded pharmaceutical
products with combined annual U.S. sales of more than nine billion
dollars. 06
100 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1112-1113, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C.).
'0 BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, AGREEMENTS FILED
WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION
DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF
AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2004 1-3 (2005) [hereinafter AGREEMENTS FILED IN
2004], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/01/050107medicareactrpt.pdf;
BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG,
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS
FILED IN FY 2011 1 (2011) [hereinafter AGREEMENTS FILED IN 2011 ], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/10/1110mmaagree.pdf.
102 AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY2011, supra note 101.103 AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2004, supra note 101, at 2; AGREEMENTS FILED
IN FY 2011, supra note 101; see also Dickey et al., supra note 10, at 356-57.
104 See Stephanie Greene, A Prescription for Change: How the Medicare Act
Revises Hatch- Waxman to Speed Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 30 J. CORP. L.
309, 331 (2005).
'0 Amended Brief for 28 Professors of Law, Business, and Economics as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 9, In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2008-1097).
106 See AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2011, supra note 101.
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One of the main problems in interpreting these figures with
respect to dynamic innovative inefficiency is that, given that the
courts did not have the opportunity to examine the issue of patent
validity, we cannot make an instant call on whether these
settlements represent bad patentees preserving their ill-gotten gains
or good patentees losing out. However, we can make some
progress towards assessing the reality of the situation. The first
contextual matter to note is that the problem of bad patents in the
pharmaceutical industry is not as pronounced as in other fields,
such as information technology, and so the percentage of bad
patents among these settlements is not likely to be significant.'o
Second, there are no strong off-setting factors. It could be
argued that good patentees can extend or preserve their patents in
the same manner as bad patentees do. This would off-set the
diminished bad patents, and restore the ex ante expected value of
pharmaceutical patents. The problem with such an argument is
that it neglects the reality of gaming at play. If a first ANDA filer
challenges a patent, its preservation or extension will rarely be
free, and the pioneer will have to pay the filer some money to
compensate it for later entry. As Hemphill and Lemley note, most
non-aggression pact settlements (those without pay-for-delay
agreements) entail entry before the patent in question is set to
expire.'" In effect, this potential off-setting factor is itself off-set
by the money paid to gain it.
The above figures also reveal that the nature of the selection
bias of generic Paragraph IV filers is particularly harmful to
innovation. As a first generic ANDA filer is relatively
unconcerned with the strength of the patent it is challenging,
knowing its bounty does not need the support of a favorable court
decision, its most rational targets are the most lucrative patents, the
blockbusters.'" For example, pioneer drug manufacturers are most
risk averse with respect to their blockbuster patents due to the
difficulties of diversification and are eager to settle and not seek a
107 See generally Mark Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents, 28
REGULATION 10 (2005).
'os See Hemphill & Lemley et al., supra note 3, at *21.
109 See Devlin, supra note 15, at *62.
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court determination when such patents are the subject of Paragraph
IV certifications.
Thus, as a preliminary matter, the first generic filers can be
confident that a Paragraph IV suit concerning a blockbuster patent
will likely not be taken so far as a decision, which has the potential
to go against the filer and rob it of its bounty. However, pioneers
could arguably be sufficiently risk averse to desire settlement in
cases of weakly profitable patents as well. What makes
blockbuster patents so attractive to generic assault is that the risk-
aversion of the patentees is severe enough in these circumstances
that they would be rationally willing to part with a substantial
fraction of the monopoly rents born of the patent in question. The
room for generic maneuvering and manipulation is considerable,
and they stand to collect a significant ransom from the pioneer
drug manufacturers.
Therefore, the more valuable a patent is, the more vulnerable it
is, and the more likely it is that its associated rents will have to be
relinquished due to a Paragraph IV challenge. This means that
pioneers can be severely punished for being successful, and so
their incentive for producing popular drugs, which are often the
most socially beneficial, stands to be radically diminished.
Recalling that the profits from these blockbuster drugs are needed
to subsidize the research and development of drugs that stand to
make a loss, the threat which generic first filers pose to blockbuster
patents could infect a large tract of the innovation landscape,
preventing the investment and development of a panoply of drugs.
With these factors in mind, it is reasonable to assert that
Paragraph IV settlements represent a mix of good patents being
shortened and bad patents being lengthened, and it is arguable that
the former constitutes a bigger share if we are happy to make a
generalized statement about the bad patent problem being not so
severe in the pharmaceutical arena. Probing the unrefined
categorization of good and bad patents will reveal a more nuanced
picture of the innovative efficiency problem, but, with this rough
bifurcation in place, we can say at this stage that good patents are
taking a hit from a policing system that is largely ineffective at
taking down bad patents.
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V. ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY CONTROL
So what response should the courts and legislature make? This
article argues that bringing the consideration of dynamic
innovative efficiency to bear on the question of reform, an
approach that combines regulatory restructuring together with
enhanced antitrust control, is required. Hovenkamp et al.'s
suggestion of inquiring into patent validity in determining
settlement validity should ease issues of ineffectual policing of bad
patents,"o while Lemley and Hemphill's proposal of earned
exclusivity will go towards preventing collateral damage to
innovation."' In order to frame the discussion of reform, we may
now turn to a brief outline of the stances courts have taken with
regard to Paragraph IV settlement agreements.
A. The Courts'Approach to Hatch- Waxman Settlements
In the early days of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the courts treated
settlements involving reverse payments with the highest suspicion.
For example, In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation"2 concerned
a Paragraph IV certification filed first by Andrx Pharmaceuticals
regarding the patent for the drug Cardizem CD, used to treat
hypertension and angina, that issued in 1995 to Carderm, which
licensed it to Hoechst Marion Roussel."' Hoechst sued Andrx in
1996 following its Paragraph IV certification filing, triggering a
thirty-month stay on FDA approval." 4  In 1997, The FDA
nonetheless granted Andrx provisional approval of their ANDA,
which would take full effect upon expiration of the thirty-month
period."5  In response to this tentative approval, an interim
agreement between Hoechst and Andrx was brokered, whereby
Hoescht agreed to pay Andrx forty million dollars annually in
return for its promise not to market its generic of Cardizem CD
without a final, unappealable court determination that the patent
110 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 3, at 1734-35.
" See generally Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 3.
112 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
" Id. at 899-903 (giving a summary of many of the important facts).
I14 Id. at 902.
1' Id.
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was not infringed."' Subsequent to the FDA's issuing its final
approval of Andrx's ANDA in 1998, Hoescht began making
quarterly payments of ten million dollars to Andrx pursuant to the
interim agreement."' Two months later, Andrx reformulated its
generic of Cardizem, and the FDA approved this version the
following year."' The interim agreement was thereafter terminated
and a settlement agreement disposing of the infringement suit was
put in place with Hoescht paying $50.7 million to Andrx for total
payments of roughly $90 million. 1 9
The Sixth Circuit found this agreement to be per se anti-
competitive, in that it guaranteed to Hoechst that "its only potential
competitor" would "refrain from marketing its generic version of
Cardizem CD even after it had obtained FDA approval."2 o In
addition, the court was deeply concerned that "[b]y delaying
Andrx's entry into the market, the Agreement also delayed the
entry of other generic competitors, who could not enter until the
expiration of Andrx's 180-day period of marketing exclusivity,
which Andrx had agreed not to relinquish or transfer." 2 ' The court
concluded that the agreement was "a horizontal agreement to
eliminate competition. . . a classic example of a per se illegal
restraint of trade." 22
In Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.TC.,123 the Eleventh Circuit
took a different approach than the Cardizem court. Schering-
Plough ("Schering") owned the patent to K-Dur 20, a drug used to
treat congestive heart disease and high blood pressure. In 1995,
Upsher-Smith Laboratories ("Upsher") developed a generic
version of K-Dur 20, and sought FDA approval.124 In the same
year ESI Lederle ("ESI") also sought to market a generic version
II6 Id.
"
7 Id. at 903.
118 Id.
19Id.
120 Id. at 907.
121 id
122 Id. at 908.
123 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
124 Id. at 1058-62 (giving a summary of many of the important facts).
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of the drug.125 After the two Paragraph IV infringement suits were
filed, two settlement agreements were made between Schering,
Upsher, and ESI.12 6 Upsher agreed not to enter the market until
September 1, 2001, in return for Schering buying a number of
licenses from Upsher.127 ESI was to stay out of the market until
January 1, 2004, and in return would receive a $10 million
payment from Schering upon obtaining FDA approval by a certain
date.12 8 The FTC condemned the agreements, observing that the
licenses paid to Upsher and ESI by Schering greatly exceeded the
worth of the products it received, rendering the license fees anti-
competitive reverse payments.12 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the
finding of the FTC and condoned the agreements, concluding "that
neither the rule of reason nor per se analysis [was] appropriate" for
the agreements,'o and noting that emphasis on anti-competitive
effects was "ill-suited" for patent cases which were exclusionary
and anti-competitive by nature.''
The Eleventh Circuit enunciated a test for the validity of
settlement that focused on "(1) the scope of the exclusionary
potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements
exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anti-competitive effects."I 32
Looking to these factors, the court found that the payments by
Schering to Upsher and ESI to refrain from commercialization did
not exceed the scope of its patent, which granted Schering a right
to exclude competitors.' 3  The settlement agreements were, in the
view of the court, made to dispose of legitimate litigation.
The Second Circuit and the Federal Circuit followed the
Schering analysis in the cases In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litigation'34 and In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
125 Id. at 1060.
I26 id.
127 Id. at 1059.
128 id at 1060.
12 9 Id. at 1062.
13 0 Id. at 1065.
"31 Id. at 1065-66.
132 Id. at 1066.
133 Id. at 1076 (noting that the agreements "fell well within the protections of
the.. .patent").
1' See 466 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Litigation."' In the former, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI)
reached a settlement agreement with Barr Laboratories (Barr) and
its supplier after Barr filed a Paragraph IV infringement suit for the
breast cancer medication tamoxifen.'36 Under the terms of the
agreement, Zeneca, a former subsidiary of ICI and the holder of
the rights to the tamoxifen patent, would pay Barr twenty-one
million dollars and its supplier forty-five million dollars for
withdrawing its challenge to the patent and for staying off the
market until its expiration by switching its ANDA certification
from Paragraph IV to Paragraph III.137 Barr also agreed to switch
back to Paragraph IV in the event of a court declaring the
tamoxifen patent invalid, thus delaying further generic entry
through its 180-day exclusivity period.' The court reiterated the
Schering-Plough considerations, and, once again, argued that
although a patent settlement agreement entails some denial of
competition, it is presumed to be valid, provided it does not arise
from sham litigation. The Second Circuit admitted that it "seem[s]
'suspicious' [for] a patent holder [to] settl[e] patent litigation
against a potential generic manufacturer by paying . . . more than
either party anticipates the manufacturer would earn by winning
the lawsuit and entering the newly competitive market in
competition with the patent holder . . . [but] the suspicion abates
upon reflection."' 3 9
In re Ciprofloaxin discussed an agreement between Bayer
Pharmaceuticals (Bayer) and Barr Laboratories (Barr), whereby
Barr would receive forty-nine million dollars in return for
switching its Paragraph IV certification regarding Ciprofloxacin
(Cipro), a drug used to treat bacterial illness, to a Paragraph III,
and not entering the market until the expiration of Bayer's
patent.'4 0 The parties also agreed that Barr would not manufacturer
a generic version of Cipro and that Bayer would "either supply
"' See 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
136 In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 193-99 (giving a summary of many of the
important facts).
1' Id at 193-94.
13 Id.
9 Id. at 208.
140 In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1327-30.
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Barr with Cipro for resale or make quarterly payments" from 1998
until 2003.1'
The majority of circuits have moved away from a strict per se
treatment of reverse payment settlements to a position of
substantial deference to patent scope. The non-aggression pact
breed of settlements attracts no judicial concern whatsoever. The
courts ground their approach on the importance they attach to the
arguments in favor of settlements that are outlined above (i.e., the
costs they save and the assistance they render to the incentives to
innovate provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act). 4 2 In addition, the
courts lean heavily on the presumption of patent validity as means
of avoiding the thorny issue of patent scope. The courts assume
that in the absence of a clear sham, the pharmaceutical patents that
come before them are valid, and are therefore capable of granting
considerable powers of exclusion to the patentees. Within the
patent's zone of discretion, the patentee can essentially do what it
pleases in a competitive sense, including paying generics to back
off. The courts have also intimated that reverse-payment
settlements are a natural element of the Hatch-Waxman regime,'43
and are necessary for its smooth functioning, drawing, once again,
from the wealth of arguments in favor of settlements to bolster this
claim.
Many see the approach of the courts as a clear failure to attend
to the problems of bad patents, one of the chief concerns
motivating the construction of the Hatch-Waxman regime.'4 4 The
obedience to the presumption of patent validity is not soundly
based given the consensus that the operation of the PTO in
granting patents is highly error-pronel45 and that the courts have
not analyzed, in depth, the economic arguments against reverse
payments since In re Cardizem.'4 6 The courts must adopt a
141 Id. at 1329.
142 See Crane, supra note 7, at 776-79.
143 See Carrier, supra note 2, at 66.
'" See Crane, supra note 7, at 776-96; Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 3, at
*25-30.
145 See Lemley et al., supra note 107; see also supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
146 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
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different attitude in order to correct the excesses of Hatch-Waxman
settlements. However, it is not certain that antitrust can act alone
in restoring the balance, especially with respect to preventing
damage to dynamic innovative efficiency, the focus of this paper.
Regulatory restructuring is needed to take significant strides in the
right direction, but before explaining the precise nature of
regulatory reform, I will first discuss the role antitrust should fulfill
in this partnership.
B. A Rule ofPresumptive Illegality
The starting point for determining the course antitrust should
take is to recognize that there are both clear economic benefits and
clear detriments to settlements within the Hatch-Waxman regime.
These benefits and detriments vary widely and independently
according to the circumstances at play. Therefore, it would appear
that treating either reverse-payment settlements or non-aggression
pact settlements as per se illegal would not be consistent with the
spirit of the doctrine. Per se illegality is a device to save courts
from reassessing the economic merits of a particular practice each
time it presents itself where this practice will have damaging, anti-
competitive effects. Hatch-Waxman reverse-payment settlements
are considered, by even some of their sternest critics, to have the
potential to be more efficient than litigation, and so condemning
their use wholesale seems inappropriate.
However, in the opinion of Hovenkamp, Hemphill, Lemley and
this author, the certainty of the 180-day bounties forces the
settlement range in the majority of reverse-payment cases to fall on
the anti-competitive side.147 Hovenkamp et al. thus suggest a
rebuttable presumption of illegality to be placed on agreements
between pioneers and generics wherein the pioneer pays the
generic to refrain from entering the market.'4 8 This presumption
can be rebutted "by showing both (1) that the ex ante likelihood of
prevailing in its infringement lawsuit is significant, and (2) that the
size of the payment is no more than the expected value of litigation
147 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 3, at 1756; Hemphill & Lemley, supra
note 3, at *17-18.
148 Hovenkamp et al., supra note 3, at 1759.
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and collateral costs attending the lawsuit."'4 9 This suggestion is
echoed by others such as Carrier and Crane,"o who differ slightly
on the details, but who both agree that a quick look into the
strength of the pioneer's patent is needed if the court is to be in
some way confident that the settlement was an expression of
legitimate risk aversion on the part of the pioneer as opposed to an
attempt to extend the life of a patent it had no right to receive in
the first place."' If this presumption were in place, the pioneer
would be cut off from its avenue of manipulation, and generics
would be more inclined to complete a Paragraph IV challenge
against a weak patent, knowing that it could not gain any greater
reward from settlement. The alignment of incentives between the
patentee and generic would dissolve, potentially leading to more
effective policing and quicker generic entry. However, a
presumption would face problems of workability in that a quick
look at the strength of a relevant patent may paint only a very
crude picture of the reality.'5 2 Some bad patents may slip through
the cracks in rebuttal, but one can say that, in general, the
presumption would bring about an improvement in policing. The
court would have to be careful not to extend the inquiry into the
merits too much, lest the case absorb the invalidity case and add
irremovable confusion to the proceedings. 5 3
The presumption would not effectively tackle the problem of
dynamic innovative efficiency born of the adverse-selection of the
generics. As discussed above, it is not weak patents that are the
choicest targets for generics, rather it is valuable patents, which
may or may not be strong.154 While valuable but weak patents will
be thoroughly policed under a presumption, valuable but strong
patents may still come under undeserved attack. If a generic is
aware that the presumption can be rebutted by a showing that the
patent is more likely valid than invalid, it will be eager to
149 id
15o See Crane, supra note 7, at 776-96; Carrier, supra note 2, at 67.
'1 Crane, supra note 7, at 776-96.
152 Id. (showing that Crane accepts this limitation, but offers a number of
interpretive aids to increase the accuracy of the "quick-look").
153 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 3, at 1759.
154 See Devlin, supra note 15, at *586.
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manipulate the owners of such a patent into assenting to a harsh
settlement agreement. Thus, for strong, valuable patents the status
quo would remain essentially unchanged-the generic would still
be armed with its 180-day exclusivity period and a knowledge that
the pioneer will likely be sufficiently cautious to avoid the full
rigor of a patent trial, even if a court has deemed that its ex ante
likelihood of success is considerable.
The bluntness of the quick look at the merits might, at times,
favor the good patentees. In contrast, a court might, at other times,
consider the chances of success of the hypothetical good patentee
to be insignificant and so force a generic challenger to take an
infringement suit to verdict, with the greater analysis of a full
patent trial that proves the strength of the patent and saves the
pioneer from having to hand over anything to the generic. But
which is likelier? Because of this uncertainty, this article argues
that a presumption of illegality would not do much to cure the
innovation ills and would serve mainly to effect more stringent
policing of bad patents and accelerate generic entry.
C. Regulatory Reform
A possible answer to the innovation and adverse-selection
problem lies in regulatory reform. Commentators have suggested a
variety of possible Hatch-Waxman Act restructurings. Recently,
Congress discussed amending the Hatch-Waxman Act in a manner
that would codify a presumption of illegality for reverse-payment
settlements discussed above, but both bills were voted down.'
Hemphill and Lemley have put forward an elegantly simple model
for reform that is very promising in terms of dealing with issues of
policing and dynamic innovative efficiency, but the authors only
focused on the first matter.'56 They suggest requiring a first
generic ANDA filer to earn its 180-day exclusivity period by
successfully defending a patent infringement suit born of a
Paragraph IV certification, as was the norm prior to 1998.' By
removing the certainty of bounty, generics would be wise to target
1" S. 369, 111st Cong. § 2(b) (2009); H.R. 1706, 111st Cong. § 2(a) (2009).
156 Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 3, at *30.157 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
FALL 2011] 65
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
patents they could expect to successfully take down, enabling them
to recover litigation costs through the 180-day period. Thus, the
potential for collusion and the preservation of bad patents are
substantially reduced. If settling a case means that the generic has
to give up its 180-day exclusivity, and hence a substantial
percentage of its expected profits, fewer generics are likely to
settle, at least on the terms similar to those of the status quo.
While some patentees may simply pay the generic more to
compensate for the loss of exclusivity, in equilibrium, the
narrowing range of joint surplus means that fewer cases settle. In
addition, a generic settlement could no longer discourage
subsequent ANDA filers because they could now earn the 180-day
exclusivity period for themselves, or at least not be excluded by
some first-filer that chose to settle.
In addition to making strides to police bad patents, a system of
earned exclusivity would have manifest benefits for dynamic
innovative efficiency. Owners of deserved and valuable patents
would no longer have to fear generic marauders, who would be put
in their place, by fear of losing litigation costs. Thus, the expected
value of blockbusters would be restored to its pre-1998 level, and
the innovation landscape in the pharmaceutical industry markedly
improved. By forcing more patent litigation, earned exclusivity
creates a situation where more legal certainty can be crafted around
the good/bad patent distinction in the pharmaceutical arena.' This
legal certainty would tend to ameliorate the risk-aversion
associated with blockbuster drugs, increasing their expected value
even more by instilling greater knowledge in the patentee and more
caution in the generics. Generics would be even more honed in on
weak patents, garnering incremental boosts in efficacy of patent
policing.
Once again, the system is not flawless, as it entails more
litigation and the attending litigation costs, but these flaws would
be outweighed by the gains achieved in the form of greater
investments by pioneers. In addition, there is still the potential for
collusion, and savvy generics with sufficiently deep pockets may
risk challenging pioneer owners of valuable patents in an attempt
158 Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 3, at *38.
66 [VOL. 13: 31
Dynamic Innovative Inefficiency
to extract lucrative settlement agreements for themselves.
However, a system of earned exclusivity would remove the
primary facilitator of harmful collusion and undue patentee
victimization-the certainty of the 180-day bounty. Pioneers
would find it extremely taxing to extend a bad patent, and generics
would face daunting risks targeting valuable but strong patents.
D. A Combined Approach
Perhaps a combination of the two reforms would be stronger
than each acting on its own. Earned exclusivity would do the
heavy lifting, in that it does not rely on an antitrust court making a
rudimentary call on the merits of a highly complex patent case for
its operation. Yet, an antitrust regime with a rebuttable
presumption of illegality could act as a supplementary check
against collusion in an earned exclusivity regime, invalidating
those settlements where pioneers, desperate to hold on to their ill-
gotten gains, are still willing to pay for generics to stay off the
market (even with increased compensation to the generic for the
loss of its 180-day exclusivity period). The viability of the
antitrust approach in courts would be aided by the greater clarity
that would emerge under a system of earned exclusivity because a
court's "quick look" at the merits would be all the more informed
by an increased number of final opinions assessing patent validity
rather than settlement validity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Settlements in the Hatch-Waxman context represent a
complicated and vexing question. In order to solve the problems
born of these settlements, we must endeavor to be as circumspect
as possible. The purpose of this Article has been to highlight an
aspect of the Hatch-Waxman dilemma that is outside popular
focus, but which could have serious ramifications if left unnoticed.
Dynamic innovative efficiency should be remembered when
gauging the desirability of modes of reform. In the opinion of this
author, Mark Lemley and Stephen Hemphill's scheme of earned
exclusivity is promising in terms of alleviating innovation
concerns. Unfortunately, as has been seen recently, legislative
reform of this issue is exceedingly difficult to achieve. Antitrust
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thus seems like a more likely candidate for change, but the
majority of the courts are loath to condemn Hatch-Waxman
settlements, and the recent Supreme Court refusal to grant review
of the Cipro case is indicative of an entrenched commitment within
the judiciary to economic arguments in favor of settlements and the
presumption of patent validity. Ultimately, from where we stand
now, we cannot make a call on the extent of damage being done to
innovation by the current regime, but if we continue to wear the
beaten path, the future for pharmaceutical invention may not be a
bright one.
